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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JUAN JARAMILLO,

Plaintiff-AP PPllant,
vs.

JOHN \V. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
11634

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appellant seeks a hearing pursuant to a denial of his
petition for habeas corpus in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After examining the transcript, the District Court,
upon its own motion, ordered that the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus be dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent prays that the decision of the trial
court be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 13th day of February, 1968, John Jaramillo
pled guilty to a felony offense of robbery. He was represented by A1r. Jay Barney of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association. The court thereafter sentenced Mr.
Jaramillo to confinement in the Utah State Prison for
an indeterminate term (R.4).
The respondent points out that no appeal was taken
from this conviction. The appellant did, however, petition for a writ of habeas corpus on or about April 2,
1969. In that petition, the appellant stated that his only
ground was that he had not been warned of the consequences of a plea of guilty to this particular crime and
punishment (R.2).
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, dismissed the petiion wihout a hearing. After an
examination of the transcript, the court stated:
" . . . ~I]t clearly appears therefrom
that the petitioner was properly sentenced,
that he had very competent counsel, and
it is the Court's opinion that the Writ
should be denied." (R.6).

It is from this Order of Dismissal that the appellant
has prosecuted this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT THE
PROPER REMEDY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.

The appellant alleges two grounds in his brief for
which he seeks review. Briefly stated, the alleged grounds
of reversal J-re: ( 1) because the trial judge failed to advise
Mr. Jaramillo of the maximum penalty for robbery, and
( 2) that Jay B;lrney inadequately defended him. Both
of these alleged grounds were known to Juan Jaramillo
at the time of his commitment to the Utah State Prison.
No appeal from this commitment was made. According
to Utah law) the proper procedure would have been to
appeal his sentence.
Juan Jaramillo is trying to use the writ of habeas
corpus as a means of appellate review. This is not the
purpose for which the writ was established. A good discussion of the purpose is found in Bryant v. Turner, 19
Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967), wherein the following is found:
" .. The writ is, as our rules describe
it, an extraordinary writ, to be used to protect one who is restrained of his liberty
where there exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirements of the law
have been so ignored or distorted that the
party is substantially and effectively denied
what is included in the term due process of
law, or where some other such circumstance
exists that it would be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction." Id.
19 Utah 2d at 286-287, 431 P.2d at 122123.
\Vhen the same facts alleged in a pet1t10n for writ
of habeas corpus were known to the petitioner at the time
of his judgment, his proper remedy is not a writ. In the

recent case of Brown v. Tumrr, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d
958 (1968), the petitioner contended that he was denied
a right to counsel and that he did not understand the
conseuences of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court of
Utah held that the petitioner was not entitled to habeas
cor;:ms remedies. The court correctly pointed out the following:

" ... If the contention of error is something which is known or should be known
to the party at the time the judgment was
entered, it must be reviewed in the manner
and within the time permitted by regular
prescribed procedure, or the judgment becomes final and is not subject to futher attack, except in some such unusual circumstance as we have mentioned above. Were
it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure
governing appeals and limitations of time
specified therein would be rendered impotent." Id. 21 Utah 2d at 98-99, 440 P.2d
at 969.
The fact5 and circumstances surrounding Mr. Jaramillo's commitment to the Utah State Prison are close
to the fact situation in Brown v. Turner, supra. In that
case the Utah Supreme Court noted:
" ... [T]he questions as to whether he
was accorded the right of counsel and was
properly advised as to the consequences of
his plea of guilty are primarily questions
of fact. The trial court having heard the
evidence relating thereto and having found
the issues against the plaintiff, it is our
further duty to indulge the usual credit due

his findings and judgment." Id. 21 Utah at
99, 440 P.2d at 970.
That case should be binding authority here, and
the ruling of the lower court should be sustained.
POINT II
THE ISSUE OF COMPETENCY CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT BECAUSE IT \VAS NOT PRESENTED BELOW.
In his complaint and petition for writ of habeas
corpus, Mr. Jaramillo lists only one ground-that he was
not warned or informed of the consequences to a plea of
guilty in a robbery charge (R.2). Nowhere in the complaint is there a challenge made to Jay Barney's competency. The only place this issue is mentioned in the
Record on Appeal is in the Order of Dismissal by Judge
Stewart Hanson, who stated that he had read the transcript
and had found therefrom that " . . . the petitioner was
properly sentenced, that he h:-td very competent counsel. ... " (R. 6).
Utah has passed on this issue before. In the case of
Burleigh v. Turnr:r, 15 Utah 2d 118, 3 8 8 P.2d 412 ( 1964),
the petitioner made the same legal move as Mr. Jaramillo. The court expressed the law in this manner:
"Appellant contends in his brief that the
failure to appeal the Third District Court's
judgment was due to the failure of counsel, appointed by this court, to prosecute the
appeal. This matter was not presented in
the pleadings or the hearing before the

Fourth District Court. It is raised for the
first time upon this appeal. Habeas corpus
being a civil remedy it is not necessary for
this court to consider this point." Id. 15
Utah 2 d at 12 0, 3 8 8 P. 2d :it 414.

It would therefore follow that the court need not
consider the issue of Mr. Barney's competency as counsel
since it was not challenged in Juan Jaramillo's complaint
and was not an issue before Judge Hanson.
There have been no findings of fact on this issue.
No testimony has been received by any prior proceeding.
The only information the court has on this subject is the
appellant's statement of facts. The court is not compelled to believe self-interested witnesses. State v. Knepper, 18 UtJh 2d 21 ), 418 P.2d 780 (1966); Aagard v.
Da)'foll c5 Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Co., 12 Utah 2d
34, 361 P.2d 522 ( 1961). The competency of Mr. Barney
is therefore not ripe for review.
Even if the court were to review the issue of Jay
Barney's competency as counsel, the court would still have
to find for the respondent.
In order to justify habeas corpus relief on the
ground that the appointed counsel was inadequate, California requires the petitioner to show that the trial
was reduced to a farce or sham. In Re Beat)', 54 Cal. 2d
760, 414 P.2d 817, 51 Cal.Rptr. 521 (1966).
In Arizona, the court allows a contention of deprivation of right to counsel to be asserted in habeas
corpus proceedings only in extreme cases. If the appellant sets forth no facts which indicate the appointed at-
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torney's performance was so substandard as to render the
trial a farce or sham, the petition is properly denied. Barrn11 z·. State, 7 Ariz.App. 223. 437 P.2d 975 (Ariz.Ct.App.
1968).
The Utah standard is a little different. In Utah a
habeas corpus remedy is allo"'ed only if the circumstances
indicate th;it it would be wholly unconscionable to reexamine the petitioner's conviction. Bryant v. Turner,
supra. The method the Utah court uses in deciding this
issue is to look at the record.
In the case of Syddall i·. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263,
437 P.2d 194 (1968). the court looked to the record to
see if anything suggested that the prisoner had been improperly induced to enter his plea of guilty. Since nothing
was shown, the court held that he had been adequately
represented bv counsel.
The record in the present case clearly shows that Mr.
Jaramillo pleaded guilty voluntarily. The transcript
quoted on page 9 of this brief shows that Mr. Barney
and the court were very careful about this matter.
In the case of \VashiJ1gfo11 v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 361,
412 P.2d 449 (1966), the court seems to look at the record for suggestions of bad faith conduct on the part of
the attorney. There is nothing in the record of the present
appeal which suggests there was any bad faith on the part
of Jay Barney.
Since the record is devoid of any suggestion of bad
faith, absent a showing that the trial was reduced to a
farce or sham. and without any indication that it would
be unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction, the
court must affirm Judge Hanson's decision to dismiss.
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POINT III
JUAN JARAMILLO WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED BY JUDGE SNOW.
Even if the court were to find that the writ of
habeas corpus is the proper remedy for Mr. Jaramillo, it
still must find for the respondent. The complaint challenges Mr. Jaramillo's custody on the ground that the
trial court inadequately explained the consequences of a
guilty plea to him. To support this ground, appellant relies on Utah Code Ann. § 77 -24-6 (19 53 ) . That section
is set out below:
"\Vhere the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court shall not accept a
plea of guilty until it shall have explained
to the defendant the consequences of such
a plea." Id.

It is clear that this statute does not apply in the
present fact situation where Mr. Jaramillo was given the
privilege of court-appointed counsel. When the defendant in a criminal action has counsel, the Judge need
not perform the defense counsel's function of explaining
the consequences of a guilty plea.
Even if the court were to find inadequate representation by Mr. Barney, the explanation given to the
defendant by the Judge was sufficient.
In Brown v. Turner, supra, the court advised the
defendant:
" ... that he was charged with a felony,
that it was punishable by a prison sentence,
and he had a right to a trial by jury. . . ."
Id. 21 Utah at 99-100, 440 P.2d at 970.
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The rev1ewmg court looked at the defendants' past
criminal activity and held the explanation adequate.
Under the facts of the instant case. the trial court
questioned Mr. Jaramillo as to his guilty plea in the following manner:
"MR. BARNEY: Mr. Jaramillo, is it your desire
at this tim~ to change your plea from not guilty?
"MR. JARAMILLO: Plead guilty and get sentence
right away. \X' aiw anything.
"MR. BARNEY: Has anyone made any threats or
promi~es to you to coerce you at any time into making
such a plea:>
"MR. JARAMILLO:

No.

"MR. BARNEY: And you enter this plea at this
time on your own free will?
"MR. JARAMILLO:
"MR. BARNEY:
coercion?

Yes.

And without any reservation or

"MR. TARAMILLO:

Yes.

"MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, at this time we
would request the right to withdraw the plea of not
guilty previously entered and to enter a new plea.
"THE COURT: You understand by so doing, Mr.
JaramiHo, it means the Court will sentence you to an
indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison?
"MR. JARAMILLO:

Yes." (T.8-9).

From the transcript, as cited above, the following
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three things are noticed: ( 1) the plea was voluntarily
made; (2) the defendant was informed that he would
be serving sentence at the Utah State Prison (felony
charge) ; and, ( 3) the term would be indeterminate.
Since Judge Snow not only appointed counsel for
Juan Jaramillo, but also explained the consequences of a
guilty plea to him, the following language from Brown v.
Turner, supra, would again be applicable:
"It appears to us that Judge Snow
actually exercised commendable care in
making sure that plaintiff understood the
consequences of waiving a trial by jury and
the entering of a plea of guilty." Id. 21
Utah 2<l at 100, 440 P.2d at 970-971.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein set out, respondent submits
that the decisions reached in the lower court must be
affirmed.
Respectfully sub11iitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General'
DAVID S. YOUNG
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respo11den!

